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Introduction 
 
States play key roles in promoting and controlling religious symbols, and yet Soares and Osella 
note that ‘insufficient attention is devoted to how the state intervenes to promote, co-opt, thwart, 
or isolate various forms of Islam and (‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’) Muslims’ (2009: 10–11). In turn, even 
fewer studies have analysed the ways in which religious symbols have been strategically 
mobilised by non-state actors. This chapter addresses this lacuna by examining the case of a non-
state actor which has de facto control over a specific refugee population. I explore the ways in 
which Sahrawi refugees’ political representatives - the Polisario Front and their related 
government-in-exile, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) - have engaged in a range 
of representational strategies which ultimately “veil” religious symbols such as mosques, 
madrasas and the milhafa, arguing that the Polisario/SADR does so in order to maximize diverse 
short- and long-term benefits both inside and outside of the Sahrawi refugee camps. More 
specifically, I argue that the purposeful distantiation from (or ‘veiling’ of) Islamic religious 
symbols has been enacted during interactions with secular humanitarian audiences to 
demonstrate the ‘ideal’ nature of the Sahrawi camps in order to ensure the continuation of 
humanitarian and political support which both keeps refugees alive in their refugee camp homes, 
and simultaneously maintains international support for the Sahrawi quest for political self-
determination (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014). In addition to engaging with feminist postcolonial 
debates surrounding the mobilization of religious symbols such as the hijab in discourses of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims, the chapter also complements emerging studies vis-à-vis the 
multidimensional relationships between religion and faith-based humanitarianism by specifically 
exploring the role of religious symbols in humanitarian encounters between ‘secular’ 
humanitarian actors and one group of Muslim refugees and their political representatives. 
Indeed, the relationship between religious identity, belief and practice on the one hand, 
and processes of forced migration on the other, has received increasing attention since the 2000s 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011a). Over the past decade, a number of journals have convened Special 
Issues which focus on particular dimensions of this relationship, including the extent to which 
state and non-state actors may persecute individuals on the basis of their religious identity (i.e. 
religion as a potential cause of forced migration; see Mayer 2007), but also how state and non-
state actors draw on or challenge religious beliefs and practices as they negotiate and respond to 
forced migration (see Godziak and Shandy, 2002). More recently, attention has turned to the 
ways in which faith principles have provided the foundations for humanitarian responses to 
displacement (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011a; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Ager, 2013), exploring the role 
of faith traditions in the historical development of concepts and practices of sanctuary and 
protection (Marfleet, 2011); the secularization of discourses of humanitarianism which had 
originally developed upon the foundations of particular faiths (Ager and Ager, 2011; Ager and 
Ager, 2015); and the ways in which contemporary humanitarian institutions may be considered 
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to have become a form of “religion” in and of themselves (ie. Hopgood’s 2006 analysis of 
Amnesty International).  
Despite this increased attention, the ways in which religious symbols have been 
strategically mobilized by non-state actors such as the Polisario Front/SADR as a means of 
negotiating interactions between refugees and humanitarian donors have been under-represented 
within academic and policy-relevant studies alike. This chapter thus draws upon the case-study 
of the Sahrawi protracted refugee situation to explore the role(s) which religious symbols play 
during “humanitarian encounters” between Sahrawi refugees in their Algerian-based refugee 
camps and across the refugee-diaspora in countries including Spain and Cuba, and European and 
North American humanitarian actors which purport to be secular in nature.1 In so doing, I 
identify some of the ways in which purportedly secular humanitarianism is nonetheless deeply 
implicated in state and non-state discourses and practices pertaining to religious identity and 
practice, especially in light of contemporary geopolitical concerns regarding ‘Islamism’ and 
‘terrorism’ in North Africa. 
 
Scripting the Sahrawi Refugee Camps  
Whilst almost entirely dependent upon externally provided support, the Sahrawi refugee camps 
have been managed by the Polisario Front since the camps’ establishment in 1975 (for a detailed 
history of the conflict over the Western Sahara, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014). In February 1976, 
the Polisario established the camp-based ‘Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’ (SADR), the 
Sahrawi ‘state-in-exile’ which has been recognized by over 70 non-Western states and is a full 
member of the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity). The Polisario/SADR 
is ‘the only authority with which camp residents have regular contact’ (Human Rights Watch 
2008: 9), and it has developed its own constitution, camp-based ministries, police force (and 
prisons), army and parallel ‘state’ and religious legal systems, the latter implementing a Maliki 
interpretation of Islam. 
The Sahrawi ‘state’, law and religion are thus intimately interconnected in the camps, 
with Islam identified in the Sahrawi Constitution as the explicit fundamental source of the 
Sahrawi legal system (Art. 2 and Art. 3 of the 2003 and 1976 SADR Constitution respectively), 
and the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs having joint functions. Despite these 
interconnections, however, the Sahrawi refugee camps have habitually been heralded by 
European and North American observers as ‘ideal’ spaces and locales of ‘best practice’ through 
explicit reference to the ‘secular’ and ‘democratic’ nature of the camps (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2010a, 2014). Indeed, elsewhere I have argued that during encounters with European secular and 
Christian audiences, the Polisario mobilizes two intersecting strategies: first, it has a tendency to 
‘silence’ and render invisible the multiple, and at times contested, roles of Islam in the camps; 
second, on those occasions when religion is mentioned, the Polisario systematically projects an 
image of ‘secular Sahrawi Islam’ which is resolutely different from any Other Islam (ibid.). The 
Sahrawi refugee camps can thus be conceptualized as stages from which particular discourses 
and political campaigns are projected internationally to convince non-Sahrawi audiences of the 
justifiability and necessity of their support for the Sahrawi ‘struggle’ for self-determination 
(ibid). Simultaneously, they emerge as microcosms in which contemporary and shifting debates 
and dilemmas surrounding the ‘acceptable’ face of Islam and the desirability of inter-faith 
relations are enacted (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011b).   
                                                
1 On interactions with Evangelical donors, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011b and 2012. 
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Public declarations made by and on behalf of the Sahrawi people apropos their 
‘secularism’ and ‘religious tolerance’ must therefore be viewed not only in relation to the current 
geo-political (in)security context and intensified rejection of Islam in the West, but also more 
localized concerns about an ‘Islamically dominated North Africa’, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ in 
the Saharan desert and Maghreb (see Keenan 2004; Zoubir 2002), and the purported emergence 
of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (see Darbouche 2007: 2; del Pino 2003). Directly opposed 
to these characterizations of the region as inherently imbued with threats and danger, the 
Polisario and its supporters explicitly present the Sahrawi as fulfilling all the non-economic 
priorities associated with contemporary notions of ‘good governance’ (‘peaceful’, ‘secular’ and 
‘democratic’), and therefore as a prototypical example to be followed by other actors in the 
international arena (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014). The Polisario have therefore successfully 
projected the Sahrawi camps as ‘ideal’ spaces inhabited by ‘good’ refugees, in part by reflecting 
mainstream European normative preferences for the development of a ‘good’ and ‘progressive’ 
Islam. In some instances, this has led to the purposeful distancing of the Sahrawi Self from Islam 
and specific religious symbols, three of which I shall discuss in the remainder of this paper: 
mosques, madrasas and the milhafa. 
Before turning to the ways in which these symbols have been ‘veiled’ by the Polisario, it 
is important to reassert that this representational strategy must be viewed in relation to the 
Polisario’s dependence upon aid provided by external actors, and in particular the material 
significance of Sahrawi refugees’ connections with civil society groups which cannot be 
understated: the  World Food Programme identifies the camps’ “very vulnerable households” as 
those which “had not built any contacts with the civil societies of Spain and of other countries 
that provide support to refugee families” (WFP 2008, 3 my emphasis). It is this palpable 
connection and physical proximity to the people who provide them with much needed material 
and financial assistance, alongside social capital, which leads the Polisario, as well as many 
Sahrawi families, to recognize the significance of the solidarity network, in contrast with the less 
visible, and more taken-for-granted humanitarian projects which are, according to my research, 
marginalized in both the popular and the “national” imagination.  
 
European Visitors and Invisible Mosques and Madrasas in the Sahrawi Refugee Camps 
The international celebration of the Sahrawi refugee camps’ success is, in many ways and 
through many means, directly associated with and even dependent upon the concealment, or 
discursive minimization, of everyday Muslim identity, practice and institutions (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh 2010a, 2014). For instance, although European and North American humanitarian and 
political visitors to the camps are typically taken by official Sahrawi guides on a ‘tourist route’ of 
‘secular’ Sahrawi institutions including the National Parliament and National Hospital, buildings 
associated with Islam, such as the camps’ established mosques, are in fact excluded from such 
tours.  
One of the clearest examples of this policy’s success is that many visitors, including 
journalists and humanitarian visitors Brazier (1997), Ryan (1999), Bryant (2004), and Thorne 
(2004) have all erroneously declared that there are “no mosques” in the camps. My own 
interactions with Spanish solidarios in the 27 February Camp indicate that the majority of these 
were unaware that the yellow and green building facing the entrance to the National Women’s 
School was a mosque (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: The ‘Invisible’ Mosque in 27 February Refugee Camp, South West Algeria 
 
When I informed them of its purpose, many Spaniards who had visited the camps on numerous 
occasions were confused by its existence, with one Canary Islander asking me “but... why do 
they have a mosque here?” (27 February Camp, April 2007).  
Indeed, a further example of the Polisario/SADR’s apparent success in hiding the 
Sahrawi’s religion includes Cazón’s reference to a Spanish host family who had been “in 
solidarity” with the Sahrawi for over a decade before “discovering” that the Sahrawi are Muslim. 
After the Spanish host mother was reportedly warned by a Sahrawi man to “remember that we, 
the Sahrawis, are also moros” (2004, 59; my translation), she laments: “That man was right. The 
religion of the Sahrawis is the same as that of the moros” (ibid., 95; my translation). Her shock 
that the man was correct that Sahrawis are, after all, Muslims suggests that in her imagination, as 
in many other Spaniards’ minds, the Sahrawi were until then not truly associated with Muslim 
identity and practice.  
In addition to the “invisible” mosques in the camps, Polisario/SADR and Western 
accounts have also repeatedly failed to document the existence of “modern religious schools” 
(madrasas) which are attended by students interested in expanding their knowledge of Islam 
following, or in parallel to, their “national” education in the camps (Gimeno-Martín and Laman 
2005, 23). Despite the SADR Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs having authorized the 
creation of two Qur’anic schools in Aaiun, Smara and Dakhla, and one in Ausserd (ibid, 32), 
these schools are not labelled and heralded  as “national” institutions by the Polisario/SADR, 
and are therefore rarely explicitly made visible to Western visitors.2  
It is admittedly the case that the mosques and religious schools established in each 
refugee camp are not frequented by the majority of camp inhabitants (as is the case in many if 
not most MENA countries), and access to institutionalized forms of practicing Islam and learning 
the Qur’an is mainly limited to those who can afford to pay the relevant fee.  Nonetheless, it is 
common to see Sahrawi refugees praying in their tents or in open spaces, and numerous children 
attend extracurricular Qur’anic classes. Furthermore, the presence of SADR jeeps outside of the 
27 February Camp mosque during Friday Prayer indicates that some such Polisario/SADR 
offcials attend these same mosques, despite habitually rendering them “invisible” to Western 
visitors to the camps. 
In addition to the ‘invisibilisation’ of mosques and madrasas during official tours of the 
camps, the milhafa is a third major religious symbol which is concealed despite its apparent 
visibility to external observers. Examining ‘the veiling’ of ‘the Sahrawi veil’ will enable us to 
examine how and why the Polisario has engaged in this particular representational strategy vis-a-
vis public and private Sahrawi religious symbols. 
 
Veiling and Unveiling the Milhafa in the Sahrawi Diaspora 
                                                
2 It is not my intention to characterize camp life either solely or primarily in religious terms, but rather to briefly 
note that a heterogeneity of religious practice and belief exists amongst different groups of Sahrawi refugees, 
varying according to multiple factors, including refugees’ generation and an exposure to different approaches to 
Islam through the study abroad programme. This is a multiplicity which is rendered invisible by the official 
discourse projected to European solidarios, and yet is a highly significant reality in the camps.  
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Throughout my research with Sahrawi youth and adults in the Sahrawi refugee camps and further 
afield in Cuba, Spain, Syria and South Africa, a selection of common claims3 were 
systematically made vis-à-vis Sahrawi women’s situation in the refugee camps: “not being 
veiled,” having freedom of movement, and not only being able to divorce freely and 
“unilaterally,” but even celebrating this event via a “divorce party”. Although I have examined 
the centrality of this intersecting set of mutually reinforcing images and conceptualizations 
which re/create Sahrawi refugee women as uniquely liberal, secular and empowered refugee 
women for particular political purposes during interactions with humanitarian donors elsewhere 
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014), in the remainder of this paper I will focus on the first of these 
elements: that of Sahrawi women “not being veiled”.  
  In the case under consideration, the Polisario’s mainstream representation of Sahrawi 
refugee women’s position and identity in the camps is founded upon the separation of Sahrawi 
women from Other Muslim women in the “Arab World,” with a particular reliance on creating 
and maintaining a distance from Islam and religious identity for strategic reasons. The portrayal 
of the long piece of fabric (the milhafa) which loosely covers the head and body of Sahrawi 
women in the camps4 therefore emerges as a highly politicized one which I consider to be part of 
the Sahrawi’s broader “politics of survival”, providing a further example of the ways in which 
religious symbols are mobilised (or in this case invisibilised) by state and non-state actors to 
ensure the continuation of humanitarian networks which are explicitly or implicitly based on 
non-economic conditionalities and geopolitical preferences vis-à-vis ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam.  
 
The Milhafa: invisible religious symbol or hypervisible traditional dress 
 
The two most different nations in the Arab world are the Mauritanian and the Sahrawi 
societies, which are the only nations where women do not cover their faces or hands. In 
other places in the Arab world, you can only see the woman’s eyes, but the Sahrawi 
women wear the milhafa, and people ask them their opinions and listen to them.   
 
29-year-old male Biology student, Havana, November 2006, my translation 
 
The veil has so frequently been centrally positioned in Western analyses (and historically, in 
Western colonial projects), that it is unsurprising that descriptions of Sahrawi refugee women, 
qua Muslim women, should also include references to veiling. Fanon’s identification and 
analysis of French colonizers’ “precise political doctrine” to “unveil” Algerian women as a 
means of conquering the colonized society (Fanon 1965, 37-38) have been the foundation of 
much feminist post-colonial work which has examined Orientalist representations of both the 
veil (i.e. Lewis 2003; El-Guindi 2003; and Woodhull 2003), and the extent to which unveiling 
women has frequently become a “convenient instrument for signifying many issues at once, i.e. 
the construction of modern [national] identity” (Yegenoglu 1998, 132). In certain historical 
contexts, we are reminded, the veil has “carried connotations of Muslim backwardness” both in 
the eyes of Western Orientalists and MENA nationalists (ibid). Indeed, as stressed by Kandiyoti 
                                                
3 I use the term “official discourse” to refer to this interconnected body of meanings and images produced by certain 
social and political actors for a particular non-Sahrawi audience. 
4 The term milhafa is derived from the verb laḥafa, meaning to cover. A milḥafa is literally-speaking a 
dress/layer that is worn over another dress/layer. 
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(1991) and Yegenoglu (1998, 135) with reference to Atatürk’s reforms in Turkey, processes of 
unveiling women as a means of demonstrating the “marginalization” or displacement of Islam 
have historically been central to the development of “secular” modern nationalist discourses. 
Contemporary popular and political debates concerning the place of veiling in “secular” 
European states have emerged as a result of many Muslim girls and women, as well as their 
families and broader communities, demanding that Muslim women should have the right to wear 
the veil (be this the hijab, chador or niqab) in schools – both as students and as teachers – and 
other public places. Major disputes have taken place since the late-1980s in European countries 
including France,5 Spain6 and the United Kingdom.7 The veil in the aforementioned analyses has 
often been identified as being the most visible (or public) sign of difference between Muslim and 
Western societies, with such “difference” being negatively evaluated by Western audiences, who 
have directly equated the veil with the oppression of women, and often claimed that 
(neo)colonial intervention has been necessary to save “brown women from brown men” (Spivak 
1993, 93). 
In more recent popular debates in Western and non-Western states, many Muslim women 
and men have framed “veiling” within a discourse of rights, arguing that the veil can enable and 
empower women rather than unequivocally “oppress” them (Hoodfar 1991; Zuhur 1992). In 
these and other historical and contemporary cases, veiling has often become a symbol of 
personal, communal and national resistance and identity, directly opposing ethnocentric and 
Orientalist assumptions, stereotypes and “unveiling” desires. Importantly, the personal, religious, 
social and political significance of the veil for Muslim women and their communities has not 
been denied or rejected, but rather emphasized, by those who argue that girls and women should 
have the right to veil, if they so wish. 
In a radically divergent approach to the direct confrontation to and rejection of 
essentialist (mis)understandings of the veil, the mainstream discourse projected by the 
Polisario/SADR to Western observers with regards to Sahrawi women is permeated with claims 
that, unlike other Arab/Muslim women, they “did not veil” either during, before or after the 
colonial era. Hence, in his Sahrawi novel/historiography, the Polisario/SADR representative to 
the Middle East discusses the position of Sahrawi women during the colonial era, stating that 
“she does not veil” (Kuttab, 2002, 63) (“hiya la tatahajjab,” where hajaba is the Arabic root of 
the verb “to conceal” or “to veil”, Qasmiyeh’s translation). Equally, like other visitors to the 
camps, Harrell-Bond was told by informants during her visit in the 1980s that “Our women were 
never veiled and they always worked” (1999, 156), and, following an interview with Zahra 
Ramdan (executive member of the Polisario’s Women’s Union and its Spanish-based 
International Relations representative), Feo also indicates that “the Sahrawi woman is not 
obliged to veil” (2003, my translation). Such official accounts of Sahrawi women “not veiling” 
either in the past or in the present appear to be largely incongruous on many levels (see Figure 
2). 
 
Figure 2: Sahrawi women wearing ‘invisible’ malahif as they wait to attend the 2007 
Conference convened by the National Union of Sahrawi Women, 27 February Refugee 
Camp, South-West Algeria.  
                                                
5 Abu-Rabia 2006; Blank 1999; Hamdan 2007; Scott 2007. 
6 Vargas-Llosa 2007; EFE 2007 
7 Tempest 2006; Sturcke 2006. 
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First and foremost, it is “unthinkable” for a Sahrawi woman not to wear the milhafa in 
the camps, as young women returning from studying in Cuba have encountered upon their arrival 
(Fiddian 2002). During their studies in Algeria, on the other hand, young Sahrawi women tend to 
wear headscarves, rather than the milhafa, as demonstrated in photographs shown by many of my 
female informants in the camps. Further, although many Sahrawi women living in the diaspora in 
the Canary Islands and other parts of Spain continue to wear the milhafa, others decide to either 
wear headscarves or leave their heads uncovered (personal observations, 2001-2010). In contrast, 
in the Algerian-based refugee camps, all women wear the milhafa, although the way in which it 
is worn varies throughout women’s life-cycles, with older women veiling less strictly than 
younger, fertile and supposedly more attractive women (also see Mernissi 2003b, 493). The 
milhafa is therefore directly related to curtailing the risk of fitna (temptation or its related chaos), 
with older women seen as being less “tempting” to men than their younger counterparts. This 
move towards “looser” or more “relaxed” veiling with age is in line with sura 24:60, which 
indicates that women who are “past the age of bearing children” and “have no hope of marriage” 
may even “take off their outer garments,” although they should remain modestly clothed and 
“not display their charms.” 
Clear confirmation that the milhafa should be considered to be a veil is derived from one 
of my research visits to the camps (2007). Given that all Sahrawi women wear the milhafa in the 
camps, upon my arrival I was clearly dressed in a different fashion to the majority of women 
there, but I still considered myself to be “modestly covered” since I was wearing a headscarf and 
loose-fitting long-sleeved shirts and trousers. Whilst living, working and conducting research in 
other countries with majority Muslim populations, this had even been sufficient to enter mosques 
which required non-Muslims to observe/respect veiling requirements (such as the Al-Azhar 
mosque in Cairo). Many women and girls in the camps, however, clearly did not consider me to 
be “covered,” with adolescent girls in particular repeatedly asking me “Why aren’t you 
muhajjaba?” (veiled, f. sing.). On several occasions during my first weeks in the camps I was 
confronted quite aggressively by three older women (between their late-50s and early-60s) on 
this matter. Whilst they, like many older (usually post-menopausal) women in the camps, wore 
relatively loose-fitting and “revealing” malahif (pl. of milhafa), frequently with only a “skimpy” 
top underneath which allowed their arms and shoulders to be seen, they were adamant that I, like 
all other young women in the camps, should be muhajjaba. 
After a short time in the camps, I eventually decided to wear the milhafa rather than a 
headscarf, resulting in older women immediately ceasing to challenge me on this matter. 
Equally, the young girls (who I believe were expressing more widely-held views) instantly 
stopped asking me why I was not muhajjaba. This direct cessation of daily confrontations 
demonstrated that, for these adult women and female children alike, the milhafa is clearly a form 
of hijab, or veil, and, further, that in their opinion women should be muhajjabat (veiled, f. pl.).  
It may appear self-evident that the milhafa is a traditional item which fulfils common 
interpretations of the Qur’anic requirements of veiling/covering, and therefore should be 
understood as a “veil,” and yet conventional Sahrawi representations of this item of clothing to 
Westerners both in the camps and in Spain purport to distance the milhafa from religious 
obligations or connotations, even overtly declaring, as indicated above, that Sahrawi women “do 
not veil.” 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2015) “The Veiling of Religious Markers in the Sahrawi Diaspora,” in J. 
Garnett and S. Hale (eds) Religion in Diaspora: Cultures of Citizenship, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 181-201. 
 
8 
 
In effect, Western observers are often informed by Sahrawi men and women that the 
milhafa is a traditional or national item of clothing, rather than a religiously-motivated one. This 
is reflected in the response offered by Khira Mohamed, a young Spanish-educated Sahrawi 
doctor based in Spain at the time of her interview, when asked by an El País journalist if she had 
ever worn ‘el velo’ (the veil): 
 
I am a Muslim, a believer, but I do not wear it [the veil]. There is no obligation to wear it. 
In the camps I do wear the traditional Sahrawi clothes and the melfa [sic], which is a long 
scarf, different from that which other Arab women wear.  
Alberola 2003, my translation 
 
The ways in which journalists writing for El País (Spain’s leading national newspaper) from the 
1980s onwards have defined the milhafa (variously written melhfa, melhhfa, or melfa) to their 
readers is of note here: in 1985, Martín refers to “...the traditional melfa (women’s clothing);” in 
1997, Sanz describes an encounter with “a woman covered in the traditional melhhfa (tunic);” 
and in 2001, Velázquez-Gaztelu met with a woman who was “wearing a melhfa, the traditional 
clothing of Sahrawi women” (my translations). 
In all of these descriptions, which are based on visits to the camps and interviews with 
Spanish-speaking Sahrawis there, the milhafa appears as a traditional dress,8 making no 
reference to which parts of the body it covers, and, in Sanz’s case, vaguely describing it to the 
reader as a “tunic.” In other cases, Sahrawi women are described as being “wrapped in colored 
saris” (AFP, 2004, my emphasis). Such an understanding of the milhafa clearly makes no 
connection to any possible religious motivations or requirements, with references to Sahrawi 
women’s Muslim identity either being entirely absent or marginal in these pieces. This 
representation fails, for instance, to recognize that Sahrawi women who attend the mosque on 
Fridays ideally wear a newly washed milhafa when they do so, and all women carefully adjust 
their malahif before praying to ensure that their heads and hair are covered accordingly (personal 
observations, 27 February Camp, March-May 2007). Indeed, not only do Sahrawi refugee 
women “veil,” but the typical assumption in the camps is that all Muslim women are Islamically 
obliged to wear some sort of veil (despite Khira Mohamed’s declaration to the contrary),9 and 
that if they are Sahrawi women, they should specifically wear the milhafa. Although I have 
elsewhere explored the diverse ways in which the official discourse creates and maintains a 
distance from Islam (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010a, 2011b, 2014), what is of interest in the context 
of this chapter is the separation which is created by the Polisario, for a Western audience, 
between “the veil” and the milhafa. 
 
                                                
8 It appears probable that Khira Mohamed does not personally consider the milhafa to be a religious item, since, 
while she may wear “traditional” clothes in the refugee camps, she does not wear the milhafa whilst in Spain, nor 
(given the journalist’s question) does she wear the hijab. Veiling has been common amongst Christian, Jewish and 
Muslim women in the Arab world (El-Guindi 2003, 595) and elsewhere (Küng 2007, 620-621), thereby highlighting 
the cultural and religious significance of the veil beyond Islam. 
9 Both before and after donning the milhafa I discussed different forms of veiling practices and interpretations of the 
Qur’an with the women and girls who were determined that I should veil. Referring to my experiences of working in 
Egypt and Syria, I indicated that some Muslim women and men in the Middle East and Europe believe that, while 
Muslim women should dress modestly, they were under no obligation to wear the veil. The response to my proposal 
was categorical: I was told that all Muslim women are obliged to veil, and that it is haram not to do so. 
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Veiling or Unveiling in the Public Sphere? 
The identifiers “veil,” “veiling” and “unveiling” are omnipresent throughout analyses of women 
in the Middle East, and yet these terms’ meanings often remain unexplored or undefined, despite 
authors referring to the heterogeneity of practice and significance given to veiling by women 
themselves and by the communities they live in.10 Lewis and Mills’ anthology (2003) contains a 
section specifically dedicated to the “Harem and the Veil,” composed of six articles by Mernissi, 
Graham-Brown, Lewis, Yegenoglu, Woodhull and El-Guindi. In this collection it is only El-
Guindi who explicitly differentiates between “veiling in two feminisms” (referring to the 
experiences and politics of Sha’rawi and Nasif), thereby exploring alternative forms of both 
veiling and unveiling. In the remaining pieces, the authors all make reference to “the veil,” 
“veiling” and/or “unveiling” without defining precisely what it is that they are describing. In so 
doing, it appears that the authors assume that their readers will a priori know what “the veil” is, 
understand its multifaceted purposes, interpretations, justifications and regulations, as well as its 
physical nature, including what it covers or leaves exposed. The Sahrawi claims that “they do not 
veil” whilst wearing the milhafa lead us to explore precisely these questions in greater detail. 
The same suras (24:30, 31 and 33:53 and 59) and examples from the hadith are habitually 
drawn upon by members of contemporary Islamic movements when they defend the Islamic 
bases for specific dress and behavioural codes (El-Guindi 2003, 588-589; Küng 2007, 621ff), 
and yet the religious requirement to veil remains a debated issue within Muslim communities, in 
part explaining the variety of veiling practices around the world. In the Qur’an, the terms hijab 
(mentioned seven times), jilbab (33:59) and khimar (24:31), respectively refer to an item/piece of 
cloth which broadly conceals or separates (in this case) women from men; “an outer garment” 
used by decent women “[when in public];” and, lastly, a long head covering (Küng 2007, 621ff). 
Whilst not included specifically in the Qur’an, many other types of veils are worn by Muslim 
women, including the burqa, chador, haïk and niqab, all of which cover different parts of 
women’s heads (including their necks and faces) and are worn in combination with modest 
clothing, often with gloves and socks (El-Guindi 2003).  
Only one of the Qur’anic terms, khimar, specifies that the woman’s head in particular 
should be covered, since hijab was initially used to refer to a curtain or barrier separating men’s 
from women’s spaces (Küng 2007, 622). Indeed, it is perhaps this notion of spatial segregation 
from men, rather than covering women’s heads and faces, which travellers such as (the 
fourteenth century) Ibn Batuta may have referred to when stating that “Maure” women in North 
West Africa “[did] not veil themselves” at the time (in El-Hamel 1999, 74). The reflexive nature 
of this term (“veiling themselves” rather than “veiling”) could lead to such a reading. It was only 
later that the hijab became associated with a woman’s head-covering more specifically (Küng 
2007, 622), and in some accounts both the hijab and “the headscarf, which covers head and 
neck”, are now in practice used interchangeably as synonyms for “the veil” (such as Heng 1997; 
Küng 2007, 622; Scott 2007). When Khira Mohamed indicated that she has never worn “it,” with 
specific reference to “the veil,” whilst admitting that she does wear the traditional milhafa, it 
appears clear that she is directly equating the hijab or headscarf with “the veil.”11 In the five 
                                                
10 Lindisfarne-Tapper and Ingham provide a detailed examination of the diversity of clothing and veiling in the 
Middle East (1997). 
11 In the Spanish context, the term “velo” is commonly used to refer to both “the veil” in abstract, and the hijab qua 
veil more specifically. Hence, Vargas-Llosa directly equates the hijab with what he refers to as the “Islamic veil” 
(2007). 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. (2015) “The Veiling of Religious Markers in the Sahrawi Diaspora,” in J. 
Garnett and S. Hale (eds) Religion in Diaspora: Cultures of Citizenship, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 181-201. 
 
10 
 
articles mentioned above, by simply using the term “veil” rather than explaining whether the 
author is referring to a chador, niqab, jilbab or hijab, not only are the various types of “veils” 
worn by different Muslim women elided, but so too is the significance of the terms “veiled” and 
“unveiled.”  
El-Guindi’s discussion of the significance of the veil in two case studies of Muslim 
feminism is particularly relevant at this point. With reference to a “public political feminist act” 
in which Sha’rawi “unveiled ceremonially,” El-Guindi reminds us that  
 
The phrase used in the discourse surrounding the context of lifting the ‘veil’ was raf’ al-
higab (the lifting of the hijab). Ironically, what secular feminists lifted was the traditional 
face veil (burqu’), which is rooted in cultural tradition and history rather than Islamic 
sources, not the hijab ... When Huda Sha’rawi dramatically cast off the veil in 1923, it 
was the face veil she removed, not the hijab. 
2003, 596 
 
As this case clearly demonstrates, it is possible to “remove the veil” and yet “remain veiled,” 
since there are different degrees and forms of veiling which Muslim women may don. Such 
insights appear to be absent from Graham-Brown’s usage of the term “unveiled” in the caption 
which accompanies a late-nineteenth century photograph of three women in Egypt:  
 
The unveiled woman in the foreground, gazing directly at the camera, is contrasted with 
the two veiled women in the background... However, she draws her head-veil slightly 
across her face in the presence of the man behind the camera. 
2003, 507 my emphasis 
 
As indicated in the caption itself, “the unveiled woman” is in fact wearing a “head-veil,” and the 
briefest examination of the photograph demonstrates that the term “unveiled” refers solely to the 
absence of a face veil, since the three women are all wearing loose cloths which cover their 
bodies, necks, heads and foreheads.   
It is thus precisely through recognizing the different ways in which “veiling” and 
“unveiling” can be conceptualized, and by asking who and what Sahrawi women and the milhafa 
are being compared with when Spanish solidarios, journalists and academics declare that they 
“did not [or do not] veil,” that we can best understand the official Sahrawi representation apropos 
veiling in the camps. Hence, if compared with certain groups of Bedouin women who wear face-
veils, or Muslim women who wear the niqab or burqa, it might be valid to note that Sahrawi 
women did not, and do not, cover their faces (major exceptions being when women protect their 
faces from the sun or the sand). Such an understanding is offered by the Cuban-based MA 
student quoted above, who claimed that the only Arab women who “do not cover their faces or 
hands” are Mauritanian and Sahrawi women who wear the milhafa. During our interview, he 
continued by (equally unfoundedly) stating that “in other places in the Arab world, you can only 
see the woman’s eyes,” leading us to recognize that, if one considers face-veiling to be “veiling” 
per se, one might in fact reach the conclusion that Sahrawi women “did not veil” in the past or 
“do not veil” in the present.   
The above discussion does not purport to claim that all analysts or visitors to the camps 
consider Sahrawi women to be “unveiled.” Yet many observers who accept that Sahrawi women 
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“use the veil as ordered in the Qur’an” often rely on interviews with women who report that even 
if do they veil, they do so “with a great deal of tenderness” and as a sign “of identity and pride” 
(Petrich 2005, my translation). Claims to this effect were made during several of my interviews 
with Spanish solidarity workers and visitors in the camps. By including these quotations and 
references, the Western observer is immediately led to contrast the Sahrawi milhafa with the 
ways that Other Muslim women veil: if Sahrawi women unequivocally embrace their identity-
enforcing milhafa with “tenderness,” we are led to understand that non-Sahrawi Muslim women 
are violently forced to wear the veil against their will.12 Accordingly, “other Muslim women” 
must experience this practice as a violent curtailment of their rights, and have their identity and 
pride subjugated as a result. 
In conclusion, while the milhafa may, as a matter of fact, be a traditional item of clothing, 
and whilst it is admittedly neither a hijab (qua headscarf) nor a niqab or burqa, the milhafa is 
nevertheless a “veil” in religious terms. As indicated earlier, nationalist movements have often 
promoted the “unveiling” of women in an attempt to both distance themselves from Islam and to 
create a “secular” (and therefore “modern”) national identity. This leads us to question the 
determination with which Polisario/SADR spokespeople have distanced themselves from the veil 
as a visible sign of Muslim identity in their portrayals of Sahrawi womanhood both in the camps 
and in Spain, just as they have rendered mosques and madrasas invisible in the camps. I would 
suggest that by doing so, the Polisario’s official discourse not only fails to confront ethnocentric 
understandings of both the veil and Islam, but is rather simultaneously based on, and in fact 
reproduces and solidifies such rhetoric for strategic reasons which are intimately related to the 
Sahrawi politics of survival, and the politics of humanitarianism in this protracted refugee 
context. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
As the Polisario/SADR is acutely aware, the potential to alienate Western solidarity groups, upon 
whom Sahrawi refugees physically and politically depend, is an ever-present possibility. In a 
context where the negative representation of Islam (and the position of women within Islam) by 
the media and politicians throughout the West prevails, distancing the Sahrawi Self from Islam 
appears to be strategic in nature, and intimately related to the Polisario/SADR’s politics of 
survival. Whilst historically characterizing many nationalist movements in the past, separating 
the Sahrawi Self from Islam becomes increasingly urgent given the current geo-political setting 
and related rejection of Islam in the West.13 Indeed, global events such as the First Gulf War 
(1990), invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (2001 and 2003 respectively), attacks on/in the United 
States (2001), and the Madrid and London Bombings (2004 and 2005 respectively) have further 
solidified Western conceptualizations (i.e. “rejection”) of Islam. This may explain the particular 
urgency with which non-state actors such as the Polisario/SADR have attempted to distance 
themselves from Islamic identity and practice during interactions with Western observers, 
including through what I have referred to as the ‘veiling’ of religious symbols such as mosques, 
madrasas and the milhafa itself.  
                                                
12 Any recognition of (for instance) Tunisian laws passed since 1981 against Muslim women wearing the veil in 
public institutions (including universities) is absent from the official discourse. 
13 On representations of Islam in the Western media, see Said (1997). “Islamophobia” is a longstanding 
phenomenon, despite having been used as a printed term only since 1991 and included in the OED since 1997; on 
Islamophobia before and after September 2001, see Sheridan 2006. 
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Combined with more localized concerns about an “Islamically dominated North Africa,” 
and “Islamic fundamentalism” in the Saharan desert and Maghreb, the prospect of creating a 
secular, modern state is an attractive one actively offered by proponents of Sahrawi self-
determination to non-Sahrawi audiences (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011a). Importantly, public 
declarations made by and on behalf of the Polisario must be viewed in relation not only to global 
shifts in the 1990s and 2000s, but also more specifically vis-a-vis high-profile (and thus far 
unsubstantiated) accusations made by Moroccan officials that the Polisario Front is a terrorist 
organisation tied to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (Darbouche 2007:2; del Pino 2003). The 
kidnapping of Spanish and Italian NGO workers from the administrative capital of the Sahrawi 
refugee camps (Rabouni) in October 2011, purportedly by members of Al-Qaeda in the 
Maghreb, reignited such accusations, which have in turn been vehemently opposed by the 
Polisario and Sahrawi refugees in the camps and across Spain. 
Such public declarations include that of a Spanish solidario who addressed the UN 
General Assembly in 2007, declaring that a free Western Sahara “could be an example for the 
world,” “peaceful, respectful of women, freedom-loving, and allied in the struggle against 
terrorism” (UNGA 2007).14 Zunes has also suggested that “having such a progressive and 
democratic model [in the form of an independent SADR] in the Arab-Islamic world may 
constitute what Noam Chomsky has called ‘the threat of a good example’” (Mundy and Zunes 
2002, n.p.). In this way, the SADR directly posits itself as an example to be followed by other 
nations, fulfilling all of the non-economic priorities associated with contemporary notions of 
“good governance”: “peaceful” = “democratic” = “secular.” 
In such a context, the term “secular” is both explicitly and implicitly invoked throughout 
Polisario and Spanish accounts of life in the camps. Such claims may be made indirectly by the 
Polisario and by Sahrawi individuals through distancing Sahrawi women from a range of Muslim 
identities and practices which are considered in the West to be oppressive. Indeed, as indicated 
above, the “unveiling” of women and officially distancing the national Self from the “Islamic 
veil” has frequently been interpreted as one of the clearest symbols of secularism (Gökanksel and 
Mitchell 2005; Kandiyoti 1991; Yegenoglu 1998, 135). Furthermore, these claims have also been 
made explicitly by declaring that “our women do not veil” (op cit) and implicitly by ‘veiling’ the 
existence of mosques and madrasas in the camps, thereby portraying the camps as ‘ideal’ 
humanitarian spaces inhabited by ‘ideal refugees’ worthy of humanitarian and political support 
by ‘secular’ NGOs and civil society networks alike. 
 
  
                                                
14 If the Taliban and al-Qaeda have been associated with “terrorist misogyny” (Ayotte and Husain 2005, 124), the 
official discourse appears to directly equate the Polisario/SADR with feminism and/or women’s empowerment. 
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